Universal Mechanisms
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- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- One-shot public mediated talk
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
- Incentives and the structure of communication
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Internal correlation in repeated games
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Mediated talk
- Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
- Two definitions of correlated equilibrium
- Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
- Deliberative voting
- Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
- Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
- A detail-free mediator
- Secure message transmission on directed networks
- Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978462 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- Stochastic games
- Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- On the existence of universally convergent mechanisms
- On the existence of universally convergent mechanisms
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Perfect implementation
- Communication on networks and strong reliability
- Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
- ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
- Interim pre-play communication
- Bounding the communication complexity of fault-tolerant common coin tossing
- Lower bounds on implementing mediators in asynchronous systems with rational and malicious agents
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- How to replace public communication with private one
- Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
- Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
- Long persuasion games
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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