Two definitions of correlated equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.001MaRDI QIDQ2201694zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christian W. Bach, Andres Perea

Publication date 17 September 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

canonical correlated equilibriumcorrelated equilibriumcorrelated equilibrium distributionepistemic game theoryone-theory-per-choice conditionrevelation principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Review text

The authors prove that the original and the canonical version of correlated equilibrium, although equivalent from an ex-ante perspective, are actually distinct -- both doxastically as well as behaviourally -- from an interim perspective: while Aumann's correlated equilibrium can be epistemically characterized by common belief in rationality and a common prior, canonical correlated equilibrium additionally requires the condition of one-theory-per-choice.

Recommendations

• Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
• A note on correlated equilibrium
• Conjugate duality of correlated equilibrium
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19674
• Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
• On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium
• A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity

Cites work

• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
• Perfect correlated equilibria
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Universal Mechanisms

Cited in

(8)

• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
• Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
• Correlated-belief equilibrium
• ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
• All-stage strong correlated equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Two definitions of correlated equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2201694)