Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity

DOI10.1287/MOOR.1080.0340MaRDI QIDQ3169013zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Françoise Forges, Bernhard von Stengel

Publication date 27 April 2011

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0340

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumextensive gamepolynomial-time computable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) 2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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• Efficient representations for team and imperfect-recall equilibrium computation
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