On Imperfect Recall in Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams

DOI10.4204/EPTCS.379.17MaRDI QIDQ6199609zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors James Fox, Matt MacDermott, Lewis Hammond, Paul Harrenstein, Alessandro Abate, M. J. Wooldridge

Publication date 28 February 2024

Published in Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05059

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Recommendations

• Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games.
• Networks of influence diagrams: a formalism for representing agents' beliefs and decision-making processes
• A continuation method for Nash equilibria in structured games
• On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
• Representing and solving decision problems with limited information

Cites work

• A linear time algorithm for finding tree-decompositions of small treewidth
• Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
• Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity
• Fast local search methods for solving limited memory influence diagrams
• Finding MAPs for belief networks is NP-hard
• Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 610968 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243356 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
• Influence Diagrams for Causal Modelling and Inference
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games.
• On the hardness of approximate reasoning
• Partial order games
• Probabilistic graphical models.
• Reasoning about causality in games
• Representing and solving decision problems with limited information
• Reward tampering problems and solutions in reinforcement learning: a causal influence diagram perspective
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Solving limited memory influence diagrams
• Stochastic Boolean satisfiability
• Stochastic Games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The absent-minded driver
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium

This page was built for publication: On Imperfect Recall in Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6199609)