A detail-free mediator

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.04.004MaRDI QIDQ2436299zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Péter Vida, Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date 24 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumdetail-free mechanismmediated pre-play communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
• Mediated talk

Cites work

• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Comparison of information structures
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
• Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Long Cheap Talk
• Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators
• Mediated talk
• Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication.
• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
• One-shot public mediated talk
• Problems With Coordination in Two-Player Games: Comment on Computational Complexity and Communication
• Repeated communication through the mechanism \textit{and}
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Universal Mechanisms
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

Cited in

(7)

• One-shot public mediated talk
• Simulation without mediator
• Mediated talk
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Communication in Cournot oligopoly
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators

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