A detail-free mediator

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.004zbMath1281.91041MaRDI QIDQ2436299

Helmuts Āzacis, Péter Vida

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibrium; detail-free mechanism; mediated pre-play communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Communication in Cournot oligopoly, Mediation, arbitration and negotiation

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