Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105890zbMATH Open1544.91072MaRDI QIDQ6604782FDOQ6604782

Authors: Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern 

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators
• Implementing Mediators with Asynchronous Cheap Talk
• Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
• Strong mediated equilibrium
• Limits on the power of cryptographic cheap talk

zbMATH Keywords

long cheap talkmediatorscommunication equilibriumparanoid beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• How to share a secret
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Sequential Equilibria
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Universal Mechanisms
• Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators
• Majority is not enough: bitcoin mining is vulnerable
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
• Asynchronous byzantine agreement protocols
• Implementing Mediators with Asynchronous Cheap Talk

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