Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable
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Publication:2949240
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_28zbMath1381.68017arXiv1311.0243OpenAlexW2886706106MaRDI QIDQ2949240
Publication date: 8 October 2015
Published in: Financial Cryptography and Data Security (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243
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