Oceanic Games: Centralization Risks and Incentives in Blockchain Mining

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_13zbMath1457.91427arXiv1904.02368OpenAlexW2934929315MaRDI QIDQ3294792

Georgios Piliouras, Stefanos Leonardos, Nikos Leonardos

Publication date: 29 June 2020

Published in: Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.02368

zbMATH Keywords

resourcescryptocurrenciesvaluesblockchainmining poolsoceanic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Related Items (4)

Ignore the extra zeroes: variance-optimal mining pools ⋮ \textsf{HaPPY-Mine}: designing a mining reward function ⋮ Market Equilibria and Risk Diversification in Blockchain Mining Economies ⋮ Griefing Factors and Evolutionary In-Stabilities in Blockchain Mining Games

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• Socially Optimal Mining Pools
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• Multiplicative updates outperform generic no-regret learning in congestion games
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