Communication on networks and strong reliability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105822MaRDI QIDQ6537239zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou, Xavier Venel

Publication date 14 May 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

networkcommunicationcheap talkprotocoldirectmediated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• Incentives and the structure of communication
• Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players
• Strategic communication networks
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Sender-receiver games with cooperation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226101 (Why is no real title available?)
• A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Designing communication hierarchies
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Fault reporting in partially known networks and folk theorems
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Incentives and the structure of communication
• Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
• Long Cheap Talk
• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Perfectly secure message transmission
• Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• Reliable communication over partially authenticated networks
• Secure communication in minimal connectivity models
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Universal Mechanisms
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

This page was built for publication: Communication on networks and strong reliability

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6537239)