Communication on networks and strong reliability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105822zbMATH Open1539.91024MaRDI QIDQ6537239FDOQ6537239

Authors: Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou, Xavier Venel 

Publication date: 14 May 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

networkcommunicationcheap talkprotocoldirectmediated

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Long Cheap Talk
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks
• Perfectly secure message transmission
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Universal Mechanisms
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
• Hierarchical cheap talk
• A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
• Fault reporting in partially known networks and folk theorems
• Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Secure communication in minimal connectivity models
• Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Reliable communication over partially authenticated networks
• Incentives and the structure of communication
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Designing communication hierarchies

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