Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.11.004MaRDI QIDQ980965zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuval Heller

Publication date 8 July 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15643/2/MPRA_paper_15643.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap-talkcorrelated equilibriumstrong equilibriumnon-cooperative gamescoalition-proof equilibriumfault-tolerant distributed computation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
• Limits on the power of cryptographic cheap talk
• Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082123 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Long Cheap Talk
• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
• Non-cooperative games
• Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Universal Mechanisms
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

Cited in

(7)

• All-stage strong correlated equilibrium
• Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
• Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
• Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators
• A detail-free mediator
• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

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