Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082123 (Why is no real title available?)
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition
- Coalition-proof equilibrium
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
- Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
- Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
- Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
- Distributed computing meets game theory
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Long Cheap Talk
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
- Non-cooperative games
- Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Universal Mechanisms
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
Cited in
(7)- All-stage strong correlated equilibrium
- Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators
- Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators
- A detail-free mediator
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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