Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0495-5MaRDI QIDQ267085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Hillas, Min Liu

Publication date 8 April 2016

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0495-5

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumimperfect monitoringstochastic signalstwo player repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
• Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
• Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
• General properties of long-run supergames
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4202069 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Repeated Games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.

Cited in

(15)

• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
• Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types
• Strong equilibria of a repeated game with randomized strategies
• Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
• What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
• Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
• Approximate Public-Signal Correlated Equilibria for Nonzero-Sum Differential Games
• I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
• Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
• Informationally optimal correlation

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