Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
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Publication:267085
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0495-5zbMath1388.91052OpenAlexW1204918052MaRDI QIDQ267085
Publication date: 8 April 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0495-5
2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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