Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002zbMath1278.91024MaRDI QIDQ665090

Yuval Heller, Tristan Tomala, Eilon Solan

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25895/1/MPRA_paper_25895.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap-talk; distributed computation; communication equilibrium; normal-form correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A18: Games in extensive form

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91B44: Economics of information

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals, Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

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