Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
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Publication:665090
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002zbMath1278.91024MaRDI QIDQ665090
Yuval Heller, Tristan Tomala, Eilon Solan
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25895/1/MPRA_paper_25895.pdf
91A18: Games in extensive form
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91B44: Economics of information
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Related Items
Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals, Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
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