Folk theorem with communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.08.005zbMATH Open1154.91336OpenAlexW2167389458MaRDI QIDQ1001817FDOQ1001817

Ichiro Obara

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.005

Recommendations

• Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
• Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring

zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamesfolk theoremprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

Cited In (20)

• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
• An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
• What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
• Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
• Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication and cooperation in repeated games
• Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
• Self-evident events and the value of linking
• Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
• Instability of belief-free equilibria
• A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network

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