College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
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Publication:2099060
DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0002OpenAlexW3006822584MaRDI QIDQ2099060
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0002
risk aversionprivate preferencescollege assignmentconditional-alloation effectconsideration effectconstrained choice
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