College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0002OpenAlexW3006822584MaRDI QIDQ2099060

Allan Hernandez-Chanto

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0002

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionprivate preferencescollege assignmentconditional-alloation effectconsideration effectconstrained choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• Constrained school choice
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• On cores and indivisibility
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Simultaneous Search
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Strategy-proofness in the Large
• Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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