Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.013zbMATH Open1281.91105OpenAlexW2007238007MaRDI QIDQ2436293FDOQ2436293

Authors: Özgün Ekici 

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.013

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zbMATH Keywords

corehouse allocationhousing markethouse allocation with existing tenantscompetitive allocationindivisible object allocationreclaim-proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• On cores and indivisibility
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
• Kidney Exchange
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Pairwise kidney exchange

Cited In (5)

• The core of school choice problems
• Top trading cycles
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

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