Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
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Publication:2436293
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.013zbMath1281.91105OpenAlexW2007238007MaRDI QIDQ2436293
Publication date: 24 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.013
corehouse allocationhousing markethouse allocation with existing tenantscompetitive allocationindivisible object allocationreclaim-proof
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (2)
Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
Cites Work
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Kidney Exchange
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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