Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.013MaRDI QIDQ2436293zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Özgün Ekici

Publication date 24 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.013

zbMATH Keywords

corehouse allocationhousing markethouse allocation with existing tenantscompetitive allocationindivisible object allocationreclaim-proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Kidney Exchange
• On cores and indivisibility
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(5)

• The core of school choice problems
• Top trading cycles
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

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