Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
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Cites work
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Kidney Exchange
- Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
- On cores and indivisibility
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(6)- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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