Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.003MaRDI QIDQ776969zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Özgün Ekici

Publication date 13 July 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

house allocationhousing marketequivalence of mechanismshouse allocation with existing tenants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• House allocation with transfers

Cites work

• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Dynamic kidney exchange
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Kidney Exchange
• Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
• On cores and indivisibility
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(6)

• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

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