A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00646-JMaRDI QIDQ672546zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yves Sprumont

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00646-j

zbMATH Keywords

exchangestrategyproofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies

Cites work

• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

Cited in

(5)

• Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies
• Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

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