Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem
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Publication:1934101
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Cites work
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B3P4
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
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