Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity

DOI10.1007/S100580100036zbMATH Open1008.91064OpenAlexW2074376486MaRDI QIDQ1602001FDOQ1602001

Authors: Sang-Chul Suh 

Publication date: 4 September 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100036

Recommendations

• Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem
• The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem
• Sharing pollution permits under welfare upper bounds
• Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods

zbMATH Keywords

optimalitymonotonicitymanipulabilitypermit sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cited In (3)

• The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem
• Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem
• Sharing pollution permits under welfare upper bounds

This page was built for publication: Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1602001)