Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity

DOI10.1007/S100580100036MaRDI QIDQ1602001zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date 4 September 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100036

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilitymonotonicityoptimalitypermit sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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