The equal share proportional solution for the river sharing problem

DOI10.1142/S0219198925500136MaRDI QIDQ7305566zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sang-Chul Suh, Yuntong Wang

Publication date 29 July 2026

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198925500136

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites work

• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem
• Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity
• Sharing a river.
• Sharing pollution permits under welfare upper bounds
• The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem
• The river sharing problem: a survey
• Trading water along a river

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