A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0593-2MaRDI QIDQ2494014zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors René Kirkegaard

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0593-2

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionsNegotiationsRationing.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(7)

• A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory
• Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
• Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
• Note on ``Guarantees in auctions: the auction house as negotiator and managerial decision maker
• Participation and exclusion in auctions
• Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
• Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets

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