Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008zbMath1347.91156OpenAlexW2345969919MaRDI QIDQ290174

Wei He, Jiangtao Li

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencydynamic mechanism designbudget balanceincentive compatibilityobservable payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities

Cites Work

• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
• Domain walls strange quark matter in Einstein-Rosen space-time with cosmological constant and heat flow
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
• Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• Incentives in Teams
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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