Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
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Publication:290174
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.008zbMATH Open1347.91156OpenAlexW2345969919MaRDI QIDQ290174FDOQ290174
Authors: Wei He, Jiangtao Li 
Publication date: 1 June 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198
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Cites Work
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Cited In (23)
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
- Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
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