Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
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Cites work
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Domain walls strange quark matter in Einstein-Rosen space-time with cosmological constant and heat flow
- Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Efficient Auctions
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- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Incentives in Teams
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
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- Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
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- Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
Cited in
(23)- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- An efficient dynamic allocation mechanism for security in networks of interdependent strategic agents
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
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