Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.008zbMATH Open1347.91156OpenAlexW2345969919MaRDI QIDQ290174FDOQ290174

Authors: Wei He, Jiangtao Li 

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencydynamic mechanism designbudget balanceincentive compatibilityobservable payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Incentives in Teams
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
• Efficient Auctions
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
• Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Domain walls strange quark matter in Einstein-Rosen space-time with cosmological constant and heat flow
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction

Cited In (12)

• Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
• Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
• A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
• A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

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