Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
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Publication:2397645
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Cites work
- A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
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Cited in
(10)- Strong forward induction
- Forward induction equilibrium
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- The implications of finite‐order reasoning
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
- Forward induction reasoning revisited
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
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