Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.013zbMATH Open1400.91101OpenAlexW2594772047MaRDI QIDQ2397645FDOQ2397645

Andres Perea

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.013

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumdynamic gamesepistemic game theoryforward inductioncommon strong belief in rationalitycorrect beliefs assumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games

Cited In (5)

• Strong forward induction
• The implications of finite‐order reasoning
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
• Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings

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