Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
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Publication:2397645
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.013zbMATH Open1400.91101OpenAlexW2594772047MaRDI QIDQ2397645FDOQ2397645
Authors: Andres Perea 
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.013
Recommendations
equilibriumdynamic gamesepistemic game theoryforward inductioncommon strong belief in rationalitycorrect beliefs assumption
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Cited In (6)
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