Forward induction equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.12.004MaRDI QIDQ417699zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Priscilla T. Y. Man

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

invarianceequilibrium refinementforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Strong forward induction
• On Forward Induction
• Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Forward induction reasoning revisited

Cites work

• Axiomatic equilibrium selection for generic two-player games
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
• Forward induction and public randomization
• Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility
• Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
• Normal form structures in extensive form games
• On Forward Induction
• On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.

Cited in

(16)

• Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
• Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
• Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
• Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing
• Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
• Player importance and forward induction
• Forward induction reasoning revisited
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
• Limitations of dominance and forward induction:
• On forward induction in money-burning games
• Perfect forward induction
• Strong forward induction
• A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games

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