Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
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Publication:1277087
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2460zbMath0915.90274OpenAlexW3126132874MaRDI QIDQ1277087
Publication date: 16 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2460
Related Items (33)
Rationalizability for social environments ⋮ Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games ⋮ On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Rational bubbles and middlemen ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Social rationalizability with mediation ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Walrasian bargaining. ⋮ Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions ⋮ Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability ⋮ On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Perfect forward induction ⋮ Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality ⋮ Bayesian coalitional rationalizability ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning ⋮ A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
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