Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games
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Publication:1815001
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0051zbMATH Open0859.90127OpenAlexW2086386133MaRDI QIDQ1815001FDOQ1815001
Authors: Daphne Koller, Nimrod Megiddo, Bernhard von Stengel 
Publication date: 10 April 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.9.4639
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2-person games (91A05) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)
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- A Complementary Pivot Algorithm for Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
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- The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
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