Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
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Publication:5958637
DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00132-1zbMath0983.68237OpenAlexW1974597184MaRDI QIDQ5958637
Kate Larson, Tuomas W. Sandholm
Publication date: 3 March 2002
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(01)00132-1
game theorybargainingbounded rationalityautomated negotiationmultiagent systemsresource-bounded reasoninganytime algorithm
Related Items (4)
Algorithmic rationality: game theory with costly computation ⋮ Computer science and decision theory ⋮ Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium ⋮ Auction design with costly preference elicitation
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- Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
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