Efficient computation of behavior strategies

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0050zbMATH Open0867.90131OpenAlexW2136427775MaRDI QIDQ1815000FDOQ1815000

Authors: Bernhard von Stengel 

Publication date: 4 August 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/267dd3b620ea83a164b24e36b3240289e483602e

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zbMATH Keywords

extensive game with perfect recallsequence form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Cited In (31)

• Limited lookahead in imperfect-information games
• Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property
• Nondominated equilibrium solutions of a multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum game in extensive form and corresponding mathematical programming problem
• The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
• Zero-sum two person games
• Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
• Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees
• A new lower bound for the list update problem in the partial cost model
• New complexity results about Nash equilibria
• Structure theorems for game trees
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• Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist
• First-order algorithm with \({\mathcal{O}(\ln(1/\epsilon))}\) convergence for \({\epsilon}\)-equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games
• Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games
• HSVI can solve zero-sum partially observable stochastic games
• Recursive inspection games
• Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
• Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game
• Faster algorithms for extensive-form game solving via improved smoothing functions
• Solving zero-sum one-sided partially observable stochastic games
• Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
• A new sequence form approach for the enumeration and refinement of all extreme Nash equilibria for extensive form games
• Multi-agent reinforcement learning: a selective overview of theories and algorithms
• Presenting an algorithm to find Nash equilibrium in two-person static games with many strategies
• A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
• The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
• Automated construction of bounded-loss imperfect-recall abstractions in extensive-form games
• Simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics for extensive-form correlated equilibrium
• Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium

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