Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
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Publication:847802
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5zbMath1185.91028MaRDI QIDQ847802
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
Publication date: 19 February 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A18: Games in extensive form
65H20: Global methods, including homotopy approaches to the numerical solution of nonlinear equations
91A25: Dynamic games
Related Items
Applications of Algebra for Some Game Theoretic Problems, Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof, Semidefinite programming for min-max problems and games, Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games, Finding all Nash equilibria of a finite game using polynomial algebra, Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model, Newton's method for computing a normalized equilibrium in the generalized Nash game through fixed point formulation, How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?
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Cites Work
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