Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
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Publication:847802
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5zbMath1185.91028OpenAlexW2154374772MaRDI QIDQ847802
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters
Publication date: 19 February 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Global methods, including homotopy approaches to the numerical solution of nonlinear equations (65H20) Dynamic games (91A25)
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