On sustainable equilibria
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Publication:6090462
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105736zbMath1530.91029arXiv2005.14094MaRDI QIDQ6090462
Lucas Pahl, Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14094
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