Sustainable equilibria in culturally familiar games

MaRDI QIDQ4352345zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Roger B. Myerson

Publication date 28 August 1997

zbMATH Keywords

sustainability of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Review text

I have discussed the importance of trying to define some formal concept of ``sustainability of equilibria, to distinguish equilibria that are likely to be played in culturally familiar settings. I have not offered any precise formal definition of ``sustainability, however. Instead, I have tried to describe an open problem, which I have pondered for long time. I have occasionally found promising new approaches to this problem, but so far none have led to the kind of simple and appealing formulation that I feel intuitively must be out there somewhere. Still I have hope that tomorrow someone may have the conceptual breakthrough that can help to fill this important gap in the game-theory literature. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0866.00071].

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Cited in

(4)

• A complementary pivot algorithm for market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear concave utilities
• Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium
• On sustainable equilibria
• Solid outcomes in finite games

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