Robustness and sample complexity of model-based MARL for general-sum Markov games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6159508
DOI10.1007/s13235-023-00490-2zbMath1519.91030arXiv2110.02355OpenAlexW3204293975MaRDI QIDQ6159508
Amit K. Sinha, Jayakumar Subramanian, Aditya Mahajan
Publication date: 20 June 2023
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.02355
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Minimax PAC bounds on the sample complexity of reinforcement learning with a generative model
- Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
- Lipschitz continuity of value functions in Markovian decision processes
- Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
- If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?
- Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning: a selective overview of theories and algorithms
- Robust Markov perfect equilibria
- Hilbert space embeddings and metrics on probability measures
- A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: Genericity, stability, and purification
- Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games
- Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dynamic Games
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Representation and Approximation of Noncooperative Sequential Games
- A birth–death model of advertising and pricing
- Integral Probability Metrics and Their Generating Classes of Functions
- Approximations in Dynamic Zero-Sum Games II
- How Does the Value Function of a Markov Decision Process Depend on the Transition Probabilities?
- Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
- Approximations in Dynamic Zero-Sum Games I
- Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory
- Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
- Prediction, Learning, and Games
- On Nonterminating Stochastic Games
- Stochastic Games
- \(H^ \infty\)-optimal control and related minimax design problems. A dynamic game approach.
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
This page was built for publication: Robustness and sample complexity of model-based MARL for general-sum Markov games