If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2006.02.006zbMath1168.68493OpenAlexW2156194062MaRDI QIDQ1028919

Yoav Shoham, Trond Grenager, Rob Powers

Publication date: 9 July 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4122247000000001156.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Uses Software

• R-MAX
• AdaBoost.MH
• GAMUT

Cites Work

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