Efficient learning equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.013zbMath1086.68110MaRDI QIDQ814627

Moshe Tennenholtz, Ronen I. Brafman

Publication date: 7 February 2006

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

Efficiency; Stochastic games; Ex-post equilibrium; Repeated games; Learning equilibrium; Multi-agent learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

68T05: Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?, Perspectives on multiagent learning, Agendas for multi-agent learning, Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize, AWESOME: a general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents, A general criterion and an algorithmic framework for learning in multi-agent systems, Learning payoff functions in infinite games

Uses Software

• R-MAX

Cites Work

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