Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games

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Publication:5623549

DOI10.1137/0121011zbMath0218.90077OpenAlexW2094689434WikidataQ96323709 ScholiaQ96323709MaRDI QIDQ5623549

Robert Wilson

Publication date: 1971

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0121011




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