The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games

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Publication:2013377

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.017zbMATH Open1393.91001arXiv1611.06845OpenAlexW2550042882MaRDI QIDQ2013377FDOQ2013377

Florian Brandl

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is given by the corresponding matrix entry, the column player receives the negative of the row player. A randomized strategy is optimal if it guarantees an expected payoff of at least 0 for a player independently of the strategy of the other player. We determine the probability that an optimal strategy randomizes over a given set of actions when the game is drawn from a distribution that satisfies certain regularity conditions. The regularity conditions are quite general and apply to a wide range of natural distributions.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.06845




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