Computing sequential equilibria using agent quantal response equilibria
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Publication:847804
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0443-3zbMath1197.91042OpenAlexW1972476146MaRDI QIDQ847804
Publication date: 19 February 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0443-3
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence
- Sequential Equilibria
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
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