Agent connectedness and backward induction

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002940zbMATH Open1237.91038MaRDI QIDQ2883140FDOQ2883140

Authors: Christian W. Bach, Conrad Heilmann 

Publication date: 11 May 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionepistemic independenceinteractive epistemologymultiple-selves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Agreeing to disagree
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
• Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction

Cited In (3)

• Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games

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