Agent connectedness and backward induction

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002940MaRDI QIDQ2883140zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Christian W. Bach, Conrad Heilmann

Publication date 11 May 2012

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionepistemic independenceinteractive epistemologymultiple-selves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals
• A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
• Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games

Cites work

• Agreeing to disagree
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games

Cited in

(3)

• Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games

This page was built for publication: Agent connectedness and backward induction

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2883140)