Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions
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Publication:6497526
DOI10.1142/S0219525920500058MaRDI QIDQ6497526FDOQ6497526
Authors: V. K. Oikonomou, Jorgensen Jost
Publication date: 6 May 2024
Published in: Advances in Complex Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
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