Publication:3512518

Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Publication date: 17 July 2008

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91-01: Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

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