On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
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Publication:328547
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0469-7zbMATH Open1388.91018OpenAlexW145770463MaRDI QIDQ328547FDOQ328547
Publication date: 20 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0469-7
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Cites Work
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Clan games
- Shortest path games
- An average lexicographic value for cooperative games
Cited In (9)
- The veto mechanism revisited
- Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems
- Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes
- Decomposition of games with non-empty core into veto-controlled simple games
- A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players
- Clan games
- Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies
- Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility
- Minimum incoming cost rules for arborescences
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