An average lexicographic value for cooperative games
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Publication:421596
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.03.025zbMath1237.91032OpenAlexW2036291866MaRDI QIDQ421596
Edwin Lohmann, Marieke Quant, P. E. M. Borm, S. H. Tijs
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.03.025
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