Undominated nonnegative excesses and core extensions of transferable utility games

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.01.050zbMath1403.91029OpenAlexW2588275980MaRDI QIDQ1753572

Haoxun Chen

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.01.050

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesgame theorytaxationsuper-additive gamescore extension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions ⋮ Interval-valued n-person Cooperative games with satisfactory degree constraints

Cites Work

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• A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Geometry of Solution Concepts for N-Person Cooperative Games
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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