Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes
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Publication:2384445
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.003zbMath1193.91014OpenAlexW2069746258MaRDI QIDQ2384445
Publication date: 21 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.003
Related Items (2)
A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players ⋮ A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players
Cites Work
- The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
- A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
- Egalitarian solutions in the core
- Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
- EGALITARIAN SETS FOR TU-GAMES
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The kernel of a cooperative game
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