Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.04.003MaRDI QIDQ2384445zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors V. Feltkamp, J. Arin

Publication date 21 September 2007

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

nucleoluscoalitional gamesNash outcomesegalitarian core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
• Coalitional games: monotonicity and core
• A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players
• Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games

Cites work

• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• EGALITARIAN SETS FOR TU-GAMES
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4093216 (Why is no real title available?)
• A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players
• On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
• A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

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