Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.003zbMath1193.91014OpenAlexW2069746258MaRDI QIDQ2384445

Vincent Feltkamp, Javier Arin

Publication date: 21 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

nucleoluscoalitional gamesNash outcomesegalitarian core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (2)

A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players ⋮ A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

Cites Work

• The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• EGALITARIAN SETS FOR TU-GAMES
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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