Decomposition of games with non-empty core into veto-controlled simple games

DOI10.1007/BF01732642zbMATH Open0625.90099WikidataQ59868890 ScholiaQ59868890MaRDI QIDQ580201FDOQ580201

Authors: Jean Derks 

Publication date: 1987

Published in: OR Spektrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

polyhedral conenon-empty corenon-negative gamesveto-controlled simple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Polytopes and polyhedra (52Bxx)

Cites Work

• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow

Cited In (6)

• On balanced games and games with committee control
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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