Decomposition of games with non-empty core into veto-controlled simple games

DOI10.1007/BF01732642MaRDI QIDQ580201zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Jean Derks

Publication date 1987

Published in OR Spektrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

polyhedral conenon-empty corenon-negative gamesveto-controlled simple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Polytopes and polyhedra (52Bxx)

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Cites work

• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow

Cited in

(8)

• On polytope of (0-1)-normal big boss games: redundancy and extreme points
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4127044 (Why is no real title available?)
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• On balanced games and games with committee control
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4064797 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games

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