Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
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Publication:1654446
Abstract: In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition.
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Cites work
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