A general approach for population games with application to vaccination
From MaRDI portal
Publication:532431
DOI10.1016/j.mbs.2011.01.003zbMath1211.92049WikidataQ42702952 ScholiaQ42702952MaRDI QIDQ532431
Timothy C. Reluga, Alison P. Galvani
Publication date: 4 May 2011
Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc3063328
92D30: Epidemiology
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
92C50: Medical applications (general)
90C40: Markov and semi-Markov decision processes
Related Items
Threshold analysis for epidemic models with high-risk immunization on networks, Voluntary vaccination strategy and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, Effects of adaptive protective behavior on the dynamics of sexually transmitted infections, Equilibria of an epidemic game with piecewise linear social distancing cost, Antibiotic resistance as collateral damage: the tragedy of the commons in a two-disease setting, Individual vaccination as Nash equilibrium in a SIR model with application to the 2009--2010 influenza A (H1N1) epidemic in France, Outcome inelasticity and outcome variability in behaviour-incidence models: an example from an SEIR infection on a dynamic network, Disease control through voluntary vaccination decisions based on the smoothed best response, Conflicts of interest during contact investigations: a game-theoretic analysis, The economics of vaccination, Games of age-dependent prevention of chronic infections by social distancing
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake
- Optimal tax/subsidy combinations for the flu season
- Modeling the effect of information quality on risk behavior change and the transmission of infectious diseases
- On evolutionarily stable sets
- Evolution and intraspecific exploitative competition I. One-locus theory for small additive gene effects
- Optimal vaccination strategies -- for whom?
- Backward bifurcations and multiple equilibria in epidemic models with structured immunity
- Optimal timing of disease transmission in an age-structured population
- A susceptible-infected epidemic model with voluntary vaccinations
- On the transmission of HIV with self-protective behavior and preferred mixing
- Rational behavioral response and the transmission of STDs
- An SIS epidemiology game with two subpopulations
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Contributions to the mathematical theory of epidemics. III.—Further studies of the problem of endemicity
- Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy
- Vaccination and the theory of games
- Markov transition probabilities. I
- Optimal Growth with Irreversible Investment in a Ramsey Model
