A general approach for population games with application to vaccination

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Publication:532431

DOI10.1016/j.mbs.2011.01.003zbMath1211.92049OpenAlexW2021870435WikidataQ42702952 ScholiaQ42702952MaRDI QIDQ532431

Alison P. Galvani, Timothy C. Reluga

Publication date: 4 May 2011

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc3063328



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