Stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibria and Pareto-Nash equilibria for multiobjective population games
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Publication:2359147
DOI10.1007/s11228-016-0391-6zbMath1366.91039OpenAlexW2531194477MaRDI QIDQ2359147
Publication date: 27 June 2017
Published in: Set-Valued and Variational Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11228-016-0391-6
Noncooperative games (91A10) Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)
Related Items (10)
Existence and generic stability conditions of equilibrium points to controlled systems for \(n\)-player multiobjective generalized games using the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem ⋮ Optimal control of generalized multiobjective games with application to traffic networks modeling ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The generic uniqueness and well-posedness of Nash equilibria for stable population games ⋮ Some kinds of bargaining equilibria of multi-objective games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns ⋮ Stability of equilibria for population games with uncertain parameters under bounded rationality ⋮ NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies ⋮ Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
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