Optimal tax/subsidy combinations for the flu season

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Publication:953700

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2003.08.001zbMath1201.91132OpenAlexW2047959624WikidataQ29398541 ScholiaQ29398541MaRDI QIDQ953700

Peter J. Francis

Publication date: 6 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2003.08.001




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