Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(93)00745-GzbMath0874.90026MaRDI QIDQ1364661

David Wettstein

Publication date: 27 August 1997

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriatransfer pricesprofit-maximizing allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Transfer pricing in a dynamic marketing-operations interface ⋮ Optimal level of transfer pricing for profit sharing: a Lagrange regularized game theory approach

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation

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